Underpricing Of IPOs By Bulge-Bracket Underwriters Acting As Lead Managers And Sole Book Runners by Mercado-Mendez, Jose
Journal of Business & Economics Research                                                                             Volume 1, Number 12 
 41 
Underpricing Of IPOs By 
Bulge-Bracket Underwriters Acting As 
Lead Managers And Sole Book Runners 
Jose Mercado-Mendez, (Email: Mercado@cmsu1.cmsu.edu), Central Missouri State University 
 
 
Abstract 
 
During the dot-com period, prestigious investment banks earned record profits underwriting 
technology IPOs, but some companies going public also lost funds, potentially, by accepting offer 
prices well below the opening price or closing price of the first trading day. Several prestigious 
underwriters have paid penalties, to the NASD and the SEC, to settle allegations about improper 
distribution of shares of IPOs of stock. However, the fines assessed by regulators have not been 
the same across investment banks. This study analyzes short-term underpricing and money left on 
the table by the most prestigious investment banks, bulge-bracket underwriters, when they 
underwrite initial public offerings of common stock. I find evidence that seems to indicate that 
some prestigious investment banks consistently underprice IPOs much less than some other banks 
when they act as lead underwriters and sole book runners. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
t is common knowledge that initial public offerings (IPOs) are, on average, underpriced. During the dot-
com period the size and the frequency of the underpricing increased dramatically. However, the degree 
of underpricing might not have been the same across IPOs underwriten by prestigious investment banks. 
The Wall Street Journal has published articles detailing the “abnormal” commissions, earned by prestigious 
underwriters, associated with IPOs priced during those years, as well as the severe penalties paid by those 
underwriters suspected of engaging in “spinning” during the IPO process. For example, on December 11, 2001, an 
article in The Wall Street Journal described that “during the height of the boom, in 1999 and 2000, the powerful 
securities unit of Zurich's Credit Suisse Group reaped more than $700 million in fees for helping bring tech upstarts 
public -- far more than any rival.” CSFB agreed to pay $100 million in penalties to the NASD and the SEC, to settle 
allegations about improper distribution of shares of IPOs of stock.  
 
Nevertheless, the penalties assessed by regulators have not been the same across investment banks. If some 
prestigious banks benefited more from underwriting IPOs, as might be indicated by the size of the fines, it might be 
possible that IPO underpricing is dependent on the type of investment bank selected to handle the initial public 
offering.  
 
The purpose of this study is to provide some new insights in the IPO literature by examining the 
underpricing practices of the most prestigious investment banks when they handle the issue as sole book runners and 
single lead underwriters. I examine short-term underpricing and money left on the table by bulge-bracket 
underwriters when they truly perform as sole book runners and single lead managers of an initial public offering of 
common stock. For example, a recent article by Logue et al. (2002) finds that “premarket underwriter activities are 
the most significant determinant of new issue underpricing.” Consequently, if an underwriter is the sole book runner 
of the issue, underpricing might be attributed, in large part, to the practices and methods used by the single lead 
manager who is handling key underwriting activities and receiving the largest allocation of shares. 
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The next section presents a summary of previous studies. The following section contains the methodology 
and data. The empirical results are presented next. The final section contains the conclusion. 
 
Previous Studies 
 
Previous empirical studies have revealed that, on average, IPOs are underpriced (see Ibbotson (1975) and 
Rock (1986)). While there have been numerous studies trying to explain the underpricing process, we still don’t 
know why companies are willing to lose some of the proceeds in the process of going public, or why companies 
would choose some underwriters that might consistently underprice more than some others. Assuming that the most 
prestigious underwriters provide similar services, and charge similar fees, would a company going public select a 
prestigious investment bank that consistently underprice IPOs more than some other prestigious bank? 
 
A recent paper by Loughran and Ritter (2000) points out that during the period of 1990–1998, companies 
going public left more than $27 billion dollars on the table. They explain that the money left on the table might not 
be that relevant since the founders of firms increased their wealth, in the process of going public, by hundreds of 
millions of dollars. Thus, according to Loughran and Ritter’s prospect argument, IPO issuers care about the change 
in their wealth, not the level of wealth. However, Loughran and Ritter do not explain why companies going public do 
not avoid lead underwriters that consistently tend to leave large amounts of money on the table. 
 
This transfer of wealth, between pre-issue shareholders and new investors, became a popular issue as the 
number of technology companies going public increased. For example, on July 27, 2000, the shares of Corvis Corp. 
rose 135 percent to end the session at $84.72, after the IPO of 31.63 million shares priced at $36. The transfer of 
wealth was about $1.5 billion. Thus, it would seem natural to ask: do all lead underwriters acting as sole book 
runners and single lead managers underprice IPOs in the same manner? Or, does the evidence suggest that some 
prestigious lead underwriters consistently underprice IPOs more than others?  
 
This study examines the underpricing evidence, from the IPOs priced during the years 1998-2000, by the 
six largest investment banks that, reportedly, are among the most prestigious lead underwriters of IPOs. 
 
Several studies have indirectly touched this issue in the past. For example, Michaely and Shaw (1994) 
examine IPOs priced by underwriters during the period 1984-1988. Their study finds that more prestigious 
investment banks (higher capitalized) underprice IPOs less than less prestigious investment banks. Beatty and Welch 
(1996) find, by using IPOs underwritten by 50 investment banks during the 1992-1994 period, that higher-quality 
underwriters (based on market share) underprice more, especially among smaller firms. Carter, Dark, and Singh 
(1998) examine IPOs during 1979-1991, and find that IPOs managed by more reputable underwriters are associated 
with less short-run underpricing. One of the underwriter reputation measures used by Carter, Dark, and Singh, 
assigns the most prestigious rank to those underwriters considered bulge-bracket banks, with a leading role in high-
quality securities underwriting. Dunbar (2000) analyzes IPOs during the period 1984-1994, and shows that 
underwriters who leave too much money on the table lose IPO market share over time. Dunbar measured investment 
bank reputation in terms of market share. Dunbar also shows that bulge-bracket underwriters (Goldman Sachs, 
Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, CS First Boston, and Salomon Brothers) charge higher fees, due 
to their reputation, when they underwrite IPOs.
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 However, a recent article by Chen and Ritter (2000) found that most U.S. underwriters charge the same fee, 7%, for underwriting IPOs in the 
$20-$150 million range. 
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Data and Methodology 
 
In this study, I examine three popular short-term underpricing measures (first-day returns): 
 
UP1  First day opening price divided by the offer price (%) 
UP2  First day closing price divided by the offer price (%) 
MLT  Money left on the table (first day closing price minus offer price multiplied by the number of 
shares) 
 
The initial sample included all the IPOs of common stock priced during January 1, 1998 – December 31, 
2000, by the six bulge-bracket underwriters mentioned in Dunbar’s study, acting as sole book runners and single lead 
managers of the issue: Goldman Sachs (GS), Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (MSDW), Lehman Brothers (LB), Merrill 
Lynch (ML), Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB), and Salomon Smith Barney (SSB). The selection of bulge-bracket 
banks also minimizes the “size effect” problem, as large, prestigious banks usually underwrite larger IPOs. Many of 
the IPOs had more than one lead manager, thus they had to be deleted. Also, even though an investment bank was 
listed as a single lead underwriter, the IPO was included in the sample only if a single investment bank acted as sole 
book runner and had a significant larger allocation of shares, twenty percent or more, than the other underwriters 
participating in the IPO. IPOs of American Depository Receipts, and unit offerings were not included in the sample. 
The final sample included 282 common stock IPOs with a single lead manager acting as a sole book runner. 
 
The information was obtained from the SEC Edgar’s web site (www.sec.gov/edgar) by using the 424B 
prospectus filings of the companies going public. The rest of the IPO information was gathered from several popular 
IPO web sites (Hoover’s IPO Central, www.ipo.com, www.ipofinancial.com, and www.ipomonitor.com, among 
others). 
 
To determine whether or not some prestigious lead underwriters underprice more than others, two types of 
tests are conducted.  First, regression analysis is used to determine the effect of specific characteristics of the IPO on 
the underpricing measure: 
 
(1) UP = b0 + b1-5IB + b6LUSH + b7RATIO + b8FLOAT  
 
where: 
 
UP =  Underpricing measure: UP1 or UP2 
IB =   Investment Bank: Dummy variable (0,1) for five of the six lead underwriters 
LUSH =  Number of shares allocated to sole book runner  IPO shares (%) 
RATIO =  Shares allocated to sole book runner  Shares allocated to next largest underwriter (%) 
FLOAT =  IPO shares  Total Shares Outstanding (%) 
 
(2) LNMLT = b0 + b1-5IB + b6LNREV + b7LNFO + b8LNMC 
 
where: 
 
LNMLT = Underpricing measure: MLT (natural logarithm) 
IB =   Investment Bank: Dummy variable (0,1) for five of the six lead underwriters 
LNREV = Natural logarithm of the previous year’s Revenue of company going public (Millions of 
dollars) 
LNFO =  Natural logarithm of Final Offer Amount (Millions of dollars) 
LNMC = Natural logarithm of Market Capitalization (Millions of dollars)
2
 
                                                          
2 The second equation only included 236 observations, as companies without revenues and IPOs with zero or negative money left on the table 
were excluded. 
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Second, a two-sample t-test (independent means, unequal variances) is used to determine whether or not 
some lead underwriters consistently underprice more than some others. 
 
Results 
 
Table I presents the summary statistics for the complete data set. The median revenue of companies going 
public was $9.5 million. The final offer amount ranged from $27 million to $2.87 billion. The number of shares 
allocated to single lead underwriters, as a proportion of total shares, was 41 percent. However, the percentage of 
shares assigned to the lead underwriter can be as low as 20 percent or as high as 75 percent. Sole book runner’s 
allocation of shares, compared to the shares allocated to the next largest underwriter, ranged from 22 percent to 344 
percent. Some companies only sold 5 percent of their total shares in the IPO, while others sold 100 percent (the 
average was only 18 percent). The offer price was around $15 with a maximum of $38 and a minimum of $6. The 
opening and closing prices, on the first day of trading, ranged from $6 to almost $300, with a median around $24. 
IPO underpricing, as measured by UP1 (UP2), ranged from almost negative 20 percent (negative 27 percent) to 
almost 900 percent (733 percent), with an average of 88 percent (96 percent). Average money left on table was $116 
million, with a maximum of $1.5 billion (minimum of negative $33 million). Finally, Credit Suisse First Boston 
(CSFB) was the lead manager of the IPOs with the highest short-term underpricing (UP1, UP2, and MLT), while 
Goldman Sachs (GS) was the lead manager of the lowest underpriced IPOs (UP1 and UP2). 
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Table I: Summary Statistics: IPOs Underwritten by the  
Six Largest Investment Banks as Lead Managers (1998-2000) 
 
N = 282 MEAN MEDIAN STD DEV MAX MIN 
REV $97,132,410 $9,572,500 $526,340,510 $7,952,000,000 
(MSDW) 
$0 
(several) 
FO $126,532,160 $76,250,000 $234,744,550 $2,870,000,000 
(ML) 
$27,000,000 
(ML) 
LUSH 41.05% 41.02% 6.01% 75% 
(ML) 
20.40% 
(ML) 
RATIO 96.42% 100% 46.65% 344.44% 
(CSFB) 
22.22% 
(SSB) 
FLOAT 18.27% 16.32% 10.73% 100% 
(SSB) 
5.32% 
(GS) 
MC $824,367,743 $480,559,405 $1,535,127,963 $17,117,500,000 
(ML) 
$76,736,330 
(CSFB) 
IPO PR $16.08 $15 $5.61 $38 
(MSDW) 
$6 
(SSB) 
IPO OP $33.77 $23.00 $33.62 $299 
(CSFB) 
$6.16 
(SSB) 
IPO CP $34.91 $24.69 $31.65 $250 
(CSFB) 
$6.72 
(SSB) 
UP1 88.51% 54.77% 107.04% 896.67% 
(CSFB) 
-19.23% 
(GS) 
UP2 96.46% 63.13% 107.08% 733.33% 
(CSFB) 
-26.92% 
(GS) 
MLT $115,942,047 $47,265,000 $194,743,791 $1,541,013,600 
(CSFB) 
-$33,000,000 
(CSFB) 
 REV = Previous year’s revenue 
 FO = Final offer amount 
 LUSH = Number of shares allocated to sole book runner  IPO shares (%) 
 RATIO = Shares allocated to sole book runner  Shares allocated to next largest underwriter (%) 
 FLOAT = IPO shares  Total Shares Outstanding (%) 
 MC = Market capitalization 
 IPO PR = Offer price 
 IPO OP = First day opening price 
 IPO CP = First day closing price 
 UP1 = First day opening price  Offer price (%) 
 UP2 = First day closing price  Offer price (%) 
 MLT = Money left on the table = (first day closing price  offer price) x number of shares 
 Lead underwriter/sole book runner in parenthesis 
 
 
Tables II and III show the results using regression analysis for the first two underpricing measures. When the 
first underpricing measure is used, UP1, Merrill Lynch (ML) seems to underprice IPOs much less than the other 
prestigious investment banks. Also, Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (MSDW), 
appear to underprice IPOs more than the other prestigious underwriters. The number of shares allocated to the lead 
underwriter (LUSH AND RATIO coefficients) does not appear to affect IPO underpricing, while the coefficient on 
the number of IPO shares, as a percentage of total outstanding shares (FLOAT), is statistically significant. In this 
case, the higher the FLOAT, the lower the IPO underpricing.  Similar results are obtained when UP2 is used in the 
regression equation. The only difference is that Lehman Brothers (LB), along with Merrill Lynch, appears to 
underprice IPOs much less than the other underwriters. 
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TABLE II Regression Analysis Coefficients 
UP1 = b0 + b1-5IB + b6LUSH + b7RATIO + b8FLOAT 
 
Intercept GS LB ML MSDW SSB LUSH RATIO FLOAT 
141.33*** 
(45.57) 
24.09 
(17.16) 
-33.29 
(20.20) 
-38.18* 
(20.69) 
53.70*** 
(18.36) 
-31.74 
(26.45) 
-0.92 
(1.05) 
0.098 
(0.13) 
-1.55*** 
(0.60) 
282 Obs F-stat = 5.79 Adj R2 = 0.12     
Standard error in parenthesis 
*** Significant at 1% 
* Significant at 10% 
 
 
TABLE III Regression Analysis Coefficients 
UP2 = b0 + b1-5IB + b6LUSH + b7RATIO + b8FLOAT 
 
Intercept GS LB ML MSDW SSB LUSH RATIO FLOAT 
148.52*** 
(46.04) 
10.74 
(17.34) 
-42.99** 
(20.41) 
-45.85** 
(20.90) 
36.29* 
(18.55) 
-36.97 
(26.72) 
-0.57 
(1.06) 
0.07 
(0.13) 
-1.69*** 
(0.60) 
282 Obs F-stat = 5.01 Adj R2 = 0.10     
Standard error in parenthesis 
*** Significant at 1% 
** Significant at 5% 
*Significant at 10% 
 
 
 Table IV shows the results using money left on the table (natural logarithm). In this case, Lehman Brothers, 
Merrill Lynch, and Salomon Smith Barney appear to underprice IPOs significantly less than the other prestigious 
underwriters. Also, the higher the revenue of the company going public, the lower the money left on the table; the 
higher the final offer amount, the higher the money left on the table; the higher the market capitalization of the 
company going public, the lower the money left on the table. 
 
 
TABLE IV Regression Analysis Coefficients 
LNMLT = b0 + b1-5IB + b6LNREV + b7LNFO + b8LNMC 
 
Intercept GS LB ML MSDW SSB LNREV LNFO LNMC 
-2.69*** 
(0.7547) 
0.120 
(0.252) 
-0.601** 
(0.301) 
-0.620* 
(0.324) 
0.140 
(0.265) 
-0.911** 
(0.364) 
-0.145*** 
(0.048) 
0.488* 
(0.269) 
0.778*** 
(0.228) 
236 Obs F-stat = 15.97 Adj R2 = 0.338     
Standard error in parenthesis 
*** Significant at 1% 
** Significant at 5% 
*Significant at 10% 
 
Tables V, VI, and VII present the t-tests for the difference in means using the three underpricing measures.  The 
results seem to support the idea that some prestigious underwriters underprice consistently more than some others, 
regardless of the short-term underpricing measure used. In this case, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter seems to 
underprice IPOs significantly more than any of the other bulge-bracket underwriters. Goldman Sachs appears to 
underprice IPOs more than the other underwriters, with the exception of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter. Credit Suisse 
First Boston underprices more than Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Salomon Smith Barney. Finally, the results 
presented in Tables V-VII, suggest that IPO underpricing is about the same for Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and 
Salomon Smith Barney, and that these three underwriters consistently underprice IPOs much less than the other 
investment banks. 
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TABLE V T-tests: Difference in Means 
UP1: First Day Opening Price Divided by the Offer Price (%) 
 
 CSFB GS LB ML MSDW 
GS -1.6194 
(0.0538) 
- - - - 
LB 2.3632 
(0.0099) 
4.3339 
(0.0000) 
- - - 
ML 2.2384 
(0.0137) 
4.0995 
(0.0000) 
-0.0169 
(0.4933) 
- - 
MSDW -2.5337 
(0.0065) 
-1.3313 
(0.0933) 
-4.4893 
(0.0000) 
-4.3592 
(0.0000) 
- 
SSB 3.3118 
(0.0007) 
5.2958 
(0.0000) 
1.1636 
(0.1251) 
1.1069 
(0.1368) 
5.1881 
(0.0000) 
P-values in parenthesis 
 
 
TABLE VI T-tests: Difference in Means 
UP2: First Day Closing Price Divided by the Offer Price (%) 
 
 CSFB GS LB ML MSDW 
GS -0.8703 
(0.1928) 
- - - - 
LB 2.7309 
(0.0037) 
3.7255 
(0.0002) 
- - - 
ML 2.3563 
(0.0104) 
3.2273 
(0.0009) 
-0.1055 
(0.4582) 
- - 
MSDW -1.8983 
(0.0303) 
-1.2397 
(0.1092) 
-4.1307 
(0.0000) 
-3.7665 
(0.0002) 
- 
SSB 3.0958 
(0.0016) 
3.9997 
(0.0001) 
0.6248 
(0.2677) 
0.6663 
(0.2542) 
4.3861 
(0.0000) 
P-values in parenthesis 
 
 
TABLE VII T-tests: Difference in Means 
MLT (LN): (First Day Closing Price Divided by the Offer Price) 
times the Number of Shares 
 CSFB GS LB ML MSDW 
GS -1.4670 
(0.0726) 
- - - - 
LB 2.2410 
(0.0149) 
3.2301 
(0.0011) 
- - - 
ML 1.1124 
(0.1370) 
1.9754 
(0.0282) 
-0.6910 
(0.2464) 
- - 
MSDW -1.9730 
(0.0256) 
-0.5488 
(0.2922) 
-3.5653 
(0.0004) 
-2.2887 
(0.0141) 
- 
SSB 2.4170 
(0.0115) 
3.2748 
(0.0015) 
0.4059 
(0.3435) 
1.0089 
(0.1596) 
3.5722 
(0.0007) 
P-values in parenthesis 
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Conclusions 
 
The evidence presented in this study seems to indicate that some bulge-bracket investment banks, acting as 
single lead underwriters and sole book runners, underprice IPOs significantly less than some other prestigious 
underwriters, regardless of the underpricing measure used. The number of IPO shares, as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding, seems to have a negative effect on short-term IPO underpricing. Revenue and market capitalization of 
the company going public appear to have a negative relationship with money left on the table. Finally, the final offer 
amount seems to have a positive relationship with money left on the table. 
 
These findings might provide some helpful IPO underpricing information to companies going public. However, 
the findings are dependent on the sample period 1998-2000, the type of investment bank (bulge-bracket 
underwriters), and the number of shares allocated to the lead manager (at least 20 percent more than to the next 
underwriter). 
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